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Case No. 20080855
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Heather Richards,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) with intent to distribute. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did Trooper Jensen have reasonable suspicion to briefly extend the traffic stop
for a canine sniff where he detected an overwhelming odor of air freshener,
observed other odor-masking agents, and saw that defendant— the sole occupant—
had two cell phones?
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress.
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal

conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including ils application
of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 15,103 P.3d 699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); improper lane travel, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-710 (West 2004); and
following to close, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a711 (West 2004). Rl-3.
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant moved to suppress sixty pounds of
marijuana found in the trunk of her car on the ground that she was detained
without reasonable suspicion. R40-49; see also R56-60. An evidentiary hearing was
held on 7 April 2008. See R55. The trial court denied the motion in a written
Memorandum Decision. R67-77 (a copy is attached in addendum A).

2

Conditional guilty plea. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant
pled guilty to the felony distribution charge, with the condition that she could
challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal, and the other charges were dismissed.
See R99-106.
Sentence. The trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate term of zero to
five years. Rl22-23. The trial court then stayed imposition of the prison term and
placed defendant on probation for thirty-six months. Id.
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R124-25.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1
Shortly before 10:00 p.m. on 8 November 2007, Trooper Jensen, of the Utah
Highway Patrol, was on duty in Summit County and observed a car traveling on I80 drift over the "fog" line separating the right side of the road from the dirt
shoulder. R67-68 (a copy of the trial court's written Memorandum Decision is
attached in the addendum). As he watched, the car then drifted into the passing
lane to its left and remained one car length behind another car traveling in the left
lane. R68. The trooper stopped the car based on these observations. R68; see also
R55:5.

1

The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
See State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157,1158 (Utah App. 1997).
3

Defendant was the driver and sole occupant. R68. In response to the trooper's
request, she produced a California driver's license and a registration in the name of
another person. Id. Trooper Jensen asked where she was going, to which defendant
replied she was driving to Minnesota to get her son. Id. When the trooper asked
why she did not fly to Minnesota, defendant said that her son did not like to fly. Id.
Seeing a picture of a four- or five-year-old child near the console, and believing from
his own experience that young children like to fly, the trooper found defendant's
response to be less than credible. Id.
While obtaining defendant's documentation, Trooper Jensen noticed in the car
a can of Armor All and a can of Lysol on the floor, several orange peels strewn on
the floor and hanging out of containers, fast food items on the floor, two cell phones,
and "a strong, overwhelming odor of air fresheners." Id. at 68-69.2
Trooper Jensen ran a warrants check but found nothing amiss. R69. A second
officer arrived and got out of his car as Trooper Jensen returned defendant's papers
and instructed her on proper following distance. Id. He then asked if he could ask

2

At preliminary hearing, Trooper Jensen clarified that the first thing he
smelled "was the oranges, and then it was the air fresheners." R54:27. He also
noted that Armor All and Lysol have a strong fragrance, id. at 25, and that he was
trained to look for all of the above items as possible indicators of criminal activity.
Id. at 9,18.
4
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car, explaining that "he had no reason to search/ 7 Id. The trooper responded that he
would have a drug dog run around the car, noting that a positive indication from
the dog would give him probable cause to search the ca=

i ne second trooper

then ran his dog around defendant s car, smi::ng ano. :•_;._;LU .;::>;.:. •
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defendant dropped a "smoking pipe" in the process. Id. The troopers then opened
the trunk and found approximately sixty pounds of marijuana. It1,
Fourteen minutes passed from the beginning of the stop until the dot:
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Trooper Jensen returned defendant's documents to when the drug dog alerted.
R70.3
Based on the above facts, the trial court determined that 1) defendant raised
no challenge to the initial traffic stop, which was valid; 2) defendant was detained
after the conclusion of the traffic stop, when Trooper Jenson returned her
documents and continued to speak with her; but that 3) defendant's extended
detention was justified by reasonable suspicion that she may be trafficking drugs.
Id. at 71, 73-75.
In so ruling, the trial court emphasized that Trooper Jensen " observed many
indications of odor masking agents," including "an overwhelming odor of air
fresheners," "a can of Lysol, a can of ArmorAll," and "orange peels." Id. at 74.
Additionally, the trial court noted that Trooper Jensen saw two cell phones. Id.
While these items "by themselves would not amount to any level of reasonable
suspicion," the trial court recognized that viewed as a totality, and in light of the
trooper's training and experience, the overwhelming odor of air freshener together
with observations of other masking agents and two cell phones in defendant's sole

3

The trial court determined the timing based on the DVD recording of the
traffic stop. See R68, 70; see also Exh. # 1.
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extension of the traffic stop to ask defendant whether she was transporting
narcotics:
Given those objective indications of possible criminal activity often
associated with controlled substances, the officer could temporarily
detain defendant to quickly dispel or confirm those reasonable
suspicions based on those articu lated factors,
Id. at 74-75. .
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defendant's car:

Trooper Jensen] took the most rational step of asking for consent,
to quickly dispel or confirm the suspicion. When that consent was
refused, the officer took the next reasonable step designed to quickly,
at roadside with a mobile vehicle, dispel or justify and confirm his
suspicion. That consisted of having a drug detection dog go around
the vehicle quickly.
;
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Finally, the canine alert gave rise to probable cause to search defendant's car,
and the subsequent discovery of sixty pounds of marijuana in the trunk justified
defendant's arrest. Id. at 75.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ruled that defendant's further temporary detention
following the completion of the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion.
Trooper Jensen reasonably suspected defendant was masking the odor of drugs in
her car when he detected an overwhelming odor of air fresheners, observed
numerous masking agents, including Lysol, Armor All, and orange rinds, and also
saw two cell phones in defendant's sole possession. The trial court's ruling denying
the motion to suppress should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
TROOPER JENSEN HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BRIEFLY
EXTEND THE TRAFFIC STOP FOR A CANINE SNIFF WHERE HE
DETECTED AN OVERWHELMING ODOR OF AIR FRESHENER,
SAW OTHER ODOR MASKING AGENTS, AND ALSO SAW
THAT DEFENDANT, THE SOLE VEHICLE OCCUPANT, HAD
TWO CELL PHONES
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that Trooper [ensen had
reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to question her about narcotics and to
run a drug-detection dog around her car. Because her further detention was not
supported by reasonable suspicion, defendant reasons, the trial court erred in
8
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"Unless an officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a further illegality/'
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, *(j 31, 63 P.3d 650 (emphasis added).
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999 P 2d 7 "Ii lartici ilate 1 n inches"'7 will not do. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. On the other
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hand, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard/ 7 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Indeed, an
officer is under no obligation to rule out innocent conduct prior to initiating, or as in
this case, extending a traffic stop. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 2 6 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 2 P.3d
507 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277).

"This is because the public interest in

investigating criminal activity is sufficiently important to justify the minimal
intrusion into personal security that such investigatory detentions entail/' Id. (citing
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273). Simply put, there need only be articulable facts from which
an officer can reasonably infer that criminal activity "may be afoot." See Terry, 392
U.S. at 30.
Moreover, when examining an investigatory stop, "it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Id. 21-22 (citations omitted). In
assessing reasonable suspicion, "[c]ourts must view the articulable facts in their
totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation
[from each other]." Markland, 2005 UT 26, \ 11 (case citation and quotation marks
omitted). Reasonable suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the
10

circumstances confronting the officer at the time. See State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f
14,147 P.3d 425 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). "Courts m u s t . . . 'judge the officer's
conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience and . . . accord
deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious
actions.'" Markland, 2005 UT 26, | 11 (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d
1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f1f 20-21 (courts
should consider an officer's subjective assessment of facts). Finally, in a "swiftly
developing situation," such as a traffic stop and investigation, courts "should not
indulge in unrealistic second-guessing." United States v. Shaiye, 470 U.S. 675, 686
(1985).
Here, Trooper Jensen developed reasonable suspicion of further illegality
during the traffic stop: He observed numerous masking agents in the passenger
compartment (ArmorAll, Lysol, and orange rinds), two cell phones in defendant's
sole possession, and detected an overwhelming odor of air freshener. R67-69, 74.
Thus, defendant's "further temporary detention" after the traffic portion of the stop
was concluded was justified by reasonable suspicion that she was involved in drug
trafficking. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31. Far from an inarticulate hunch, Trooper
Jensen's brief detention of defendant was based on objective facts that supported a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
11

This Court has previously recognized that "the presence of multiple air
fresheners [is an] accepted . . . factor that can support, when viewed in conjunction
with other facts, the existence of reasonable suspicion of drug use or
transportation/ 7 State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, | 13, 89 P.3d 185. The Tenth
Circuit has also recognized that the smell of air freshener and other strong odors can
support "reasonable suspicion on the part of law enforcement officials that the odor
is being used to mask the smell of drugs/' State v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107,1114 (10th
Cir. 1998); see also United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171,1178-79 (10th Cir. 2000) (scent
of air freshener); United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997)
(strong smell of detergent and observation of detergent crystals); United States v.
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 1995) (strong smell of perfume);
United States v. Ray, 973 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir. 1992) (recognizing orange peels
often used to mask odor of marijuana); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359,362 (10th
Cir. 1989) (strong smell of patchouli oil); accord Flood v. State, 2007 WY167, | 21,169
P.3d 538 (strong odor of cologne).
Some courts consider multiple air fresheners sufficient without more to
support reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 175 Fed. Appx. 261,
2006 WL 1266523 (10th Cir. 2006) ("presence of numerous air fresheners — in this
case at least five —with differing scents, coupled with open rear windows and
12

additional unopened air fresheners'7 established reasonable suspicion). But here, in
addition to the multiple masking agents (Lysol, ArmorAll, and orange peels) and
the overwhelming odor of air fresheners, the officer observed two cell phones.
While law-abiding people do carry multiple cell phones, they are common among
drug dealers, and so may contribute to reasonable suspicion. See Jeter, 175 Fed.
Appx. 261, 265 ("presence of multiple cell phones, while possibly innocuous
considered in a vacuum, heightened the trooper's suspicion"); see also United States
v. Newland, 246 Fed. Appx. 180,189, 2007 WL 1655558 (4th Cir. 2007) (multiple cell
phones supported reasonable suspicion driver and sole occupant engaged in drug
trafficking). This is because "drug couriers are often given a phone by drug dealers
for use to stay in contact throughout the trip/ 7 United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244
Fed.Appx. 121, 122, 2007 WL 1852139 (9th Cir. 2007) (three cell phones for two
vehicle occupants supported reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking). Thus here,
the presence of multiple masking agents, overwhelming smell of air fresheners, and
an extra cell phone would have warranted a reasonable officer to suspect drug
trafficking.
United States v. Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276 (D. Utah 1999), cited by defendant,
bears little resemblance to this case. Farias involved no overwhelming odor of air
fresheners, no observations of multiple masking agents, and no extraneous cell
13

phones. Rather, the government argued that Farias and his companions' extended
detention was justified by the officer's observation of "a road atlas, fast food
wrappers, and little luggage in the vehicle," where the occupants claimed to be on a
cross-country trip to Iowa from California, and finally, the observation and smell of
air fresheners. Id. at 1282. The district court rejected the government's argument,
ruling that the smell of air freshener was "the strongest support for [the officer's]
suspicion of criminal activity," but that the smell of air freshener was "neutralized"
in that case because none of the other factors relied upon suggested criminality, and
there was "no indication that the air fresheners were masking the odor of drugs." Id.
at 1283. Here, in contrast, the presence of multiple masking agents, an extra cell
phone, and the overwhelming smell of air fresheners reasonably suggested defendant
was masking the odor of drugs.
Finally, defendant cites examples of Trooper Jensen's testimony at the
preliminary and suppression hearings and asserts that the trooper's "subjective
belief and impressions at the time of the extension of the stop help to create an
appropriate context in which whether reasonable suspicion existed is determined."
Aplt. Br. at 11. According to defendant, Trooper Jensen testified that he "was
searching for a reason to search the car, implying that he had no reason at that
time." Aplt. Br. at 10 (citing R55:25 & "video"). Defendant also claims that the
14

trooper believed that defendant "was free to leave." Id. at 10-11 (citing R54:28 and
R55:17). To the extent the record supports defendant's characterization of Trooper
Jensen's testimony, his reliance thereon is unavailing. 4
Trooper Jensen never expressly testified that he did not believe that he had
reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant. To the contrary, he testified that
he believed he did have reasonable suspicion to briefly extend the traffic stop. See,
e.g., R55:18-19. At most, the trooper's testimony supports that he did not believe
that he had probable cause to conduct a warrantless automobile search. See R55:910. Accordingly, as the trial court ruled, the trooper reasonably sought to confirm
his suspicion that defendant was trafficking drugs by asking if the vehicle contained
drugs and for consent to search— and when consent was refused — running a drug-

4

Testimony that Trooper Jensen was allegedly looking for a reason to search
does not appear at the record cite provided by defendant. See Aplt. Br. at 10 (citing
R55/25 (video)). A DVD of the traffic stop was received into evidence at R55:25, but
the DVD was not included in the record on appeal. However, at another point in
the record, Trooper Jensen did testify that defendant asked him "what [his] reason
to search was," and that he told her, "[he] did not have a reason." R55:9; see also id.
at 10 ("I believe I asked her for a reason, if she had a reason or something like that.
I'm asking [defendant] for the reason"). However, this conversation occurred prior
to the canine sniff and alert. Id.
Additionally, although Trooper Jensen testified that defendant "could have
left" once the traffic portion of the stop was concluded, he also clarified that he
would not in fact have allowed to her to leave at that time, because he suspected
that she may be transporting narcotics. See R55:17-19; see also R54:28-29.
15

detection dog around the vehicle. See R74-75. The trooper's conduct here would
have been unreasonable only if he had conducted a search before he had probable
cause, or before the drug-detection dog alerted on defendant's trunk. Because the
trooper diligently sought to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion of "further
illegality/ 7 or that defendant may be transporting drugs, the "temporary further
detention" of defendant for brief questioning and a canine sniff — all of which took
less than five minutes — was justified. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 31; R70,73-75; see also
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.
In

any

event,

even

assuming

the

record

supported

defendant's

characterization of the trooper's testimony, the reasonableness of officer conduct is
judged against an objective standard. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; see also Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). An "officer's subjective motivation is
irrelevant." Bngham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (officer's understanding of legal justification for action
irrelevant); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ^ 20,194 P.3d 925 (lecognizing
officer's "subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant"). While an officer's
subjective interpretation of the facts is "one of several possible aritculable facts a
court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances," State v. Warren, 2003
UT 36, ^f 21, 78 P.3d 590, it is not dispositive. Particularly where, as shown above,
16

the totality of the circumstances, including the presence of multiple masking agents,
an extra cell phone, and overwhelming smell of air fresheners "'would warrant a
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate/'
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 6 May 2009.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

Addendum A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 071500331
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
HEATHER M. RICHARDS,
Defendant.
DATE: May 21, 2008
The above matter came before the court for decision on
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

BACKGROUND
An information was filed on November 15, 2007, charging
defendant with possession of a controlled substance, possession
of drug paraphernalia and two traffic offenses, improper lane
travel and following too close. After being bound over after a
preliminary hearing on March 3, 2008, defendant filed a motion to
suppress on March 26, 2008.

An evidentiary hearing was held

April 7, 2008, the court took the matter under advisement and
allowed the parties to file further memoranda. Defendant filed a
further memorandum May 2, 2008, the State filed its response May
13, 2008. Oral argument was held May 19, 2008.

The court took

the issues under advisement.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jason Jensen (Jensen) was on
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duty on November 8, 2007, at about 9:45 p.m, when he observed a
vehicle on 1-80 traveling eastbound.
the

The vehicle drifted over

NN

fog" line, or solid line marking the outside of the lane

separating the roadway from the dirt shoulder.

Then the vehicle

drifted into the fast, or left lane, and it was following another
vehicle at the distance of one car length in that fast lane.
Based on those observations Jensen stopped the vehicle at about
mile post 148 and approached the passenger side. The event was
captured and is on a DVD which was introduced into evidence and
which has been viewed by the court. Ex. 1.
2. Defendant was the driver and sole occupant.

Jensen asked

for license and registration and defendant produced a California
driver license and a registration in the name of another person.
3. Jensen asked where defendant was going and she said to
get her son in Minnesota as he did not like to fly after Jensen
asked why she was not flying. Jensen saw a photo of a four or
five year old child, in the console area of the vehicle, and
believed that explanation to be fanciful as it was his belief
that any young child would like to fly and he based that on his
experience that his own children like to fly.
4. During this interchange of documents and conversation
Jensen saw a can of Armor-All on the floor, several orange peels
lying about on the floor and partially in and out of containers,
a can of Lysol and fast food items on the floor.

He also saw two
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cell phones and the vehicle had a strong, overwhelming odor of
air fresheners.
5. Jensen ran a documents check and the license was valid
and there were no warrants for defendant.

He returned to

defendant and returned her documents to her. He gave her some
instructions on not following too closely,
6. Jensen then asked defendant if he could ask some
questions and she said yes.

Jensen did not tell defendant she

was free to leave nor did she ask if she could leave.

He was

parked behind her and his emergency lights were still engaged.
Another officer had arrived and could not be seen on the camera
but his voice could be heard and thus the court finds that the
second officer was thus out if his vehicle when Jensen returned
to defendant's vehicle.
Jensen.

That other trooper was parked behind

Jensen asked defendant if she had any prescription drugs

or weapons or illegal substances, then asked if she had
marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, or ecstacy and she
said no.

He asked if she used such substances and she said no.

He asked if he could search her vehicle and she said no. He asked
why not and she responded that he had no reason to search. Jensen
stated he was going to have a dog run around the vehicle and if
it indicated that would be probable cause to search the vehicle.
He asked her to roll up her window.
7. The other trooper, Cole Douglas (Douglas) who had arrived
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at the scene was asked to get his dog out as Jensen's dog was not
working well that night.

In fact Jensen had his own service

animal in his, Jensen's vehicle.

Douglas "ran" his drug

detection dog around the vehicle defendant was driving.

The dog

alerted on the trunk area and placed his nose on the rear license
plate and scratched at the area.
8. Jensen then went to defendant and defendant, who was on
the cell phone at the time telling someone she was being asked to
get out of her car, to get out and as she did so she dropped an
object onto the ground, and it was a smoking pipe.

Jensen asked

what that was and defendant said she was trying to hide it.
9. The troopers opened the trunk and found a large amount of
marijuana, about 60 pounds. They first searched the interior of
the vehicle.
10. The entire event, from the stop to the point the dog
"hit" on the rear of the vehicle, took from 2143 hours to 2157
hours, or 14 minutes.

From the time Jensen returned the

documents to defendant it was 4 minutes until the dog hit on the
rear of defendant's vehicle according to the recording of the
event. Thus, the claimed illegal detention in this case was the
period of 4 minutes plus but under 5 minutes according to the
recording.
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DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Here the stop is not challenged and it was justified
based on the driving pattern where defendant crossed over the fog
line then followed another vehicle too closely. The actual search
is not challenged and the only issue is whether there was
sufficient objective suspicion to justify a detention beyond the
traffic stop.
2. As is the clear Utah law, as recently reflected in
v.

Baker,

2008

UT App 115,

State

a seizure occurs if in view of all the

circumstances a reasonable person would have believed he was not
free to leave.

The State bears the burden of proving the

reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative
detention. The officer may detain the driver to conduct a limited
investigation of the circumstances that caused the detention.
The detention, if it exceeds the reason for the original traffic
stop, must be temporary and necessary and must be based on
reasonable suspicion the officer can articulate.

The court looks

to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there is an
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a
continued detention.
3. Here, obviously, the officer stopped the vehicle for
traffic violations and in the legitimate course of that
investigation observed facts that, at least to the officer,
yielded suspicion sufficient to justify a further detention. Of
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course the legal question is not whether this officer believed
there was sufficient basis for the detention, but it is an
objective question. The traffic issues had been resolved by that
time after the officer legitimately obtained her documents, ran
checks, and engaged in brief contestation about defendant's
destination and travel.
already lawful stop.

That conversation did not delay the

The issue clearly then is whether those

observations objectively, as opposed to subjectively, amount to
reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention.
4. Further, as to defendant's concerns about Jensen's
"contradictory" statements about whether defendant was or was not
free to leave, those feelings and testimony of Jensen,
respectfully to Jensen, irrelevant.
standard.

It is again an objective

A person is not detained because the officer oelieves

there is a detention or testifies there is a detention, nor is
the person free to leave because the officer believes or
testifies she is free to leave. That determination is an
objective one for the court.
5. Once Jensen returned the documents to defendant she was
either free to leave or detained. The State does not contend this
was a consensual encounter and it was not, despite Jensen's
possible belief and testimony she may have been free to leave. If
a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave
the person was seized.

Here, the court concludes there was a
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continued seizure.

The officer was talking to defendant, his

emergency lights were on in back of defendant's vehicle, there
was another officer present, the officer was asking about drugs
being in the vehicle, and the court concludes it is a rare
person, when an officer is talking through a window to a driver,
who would believe they are free to leave. It is true defendant
did not ask if she could leave, but all the factors indicate to
the court that defendant, as an objectively reasonable person,
would not feel free to leave.

Jensen did not tell defendant she

was free to leave. That is not, of course, required for this to
be a consensual encounter, but it remains a factor. In total here
there is no indication that a reasonable person would have felt
free to leave, and so the court concludes defendant was in fact
detained after Jensen returned the documents to her and continued
to speak with her.
6. Here, the factors observed by Jensen are frequent and
recurring and fairly "standard."

Jensen believed the travel

plans made little sense because defendant stated her son,
approximately age 5, did not like to fly.

While that may be

unusual, it is not of course by itself unreasonable. The court
concludes it is not a legitimate factor that the court considers
as it was and is based on Jensen's personal experiences.

While

it may have been suspicious to Jensen, it is not a factor that
adds anything, even in combination, with the other factors.
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7. Jensen observed many indications of odor masking agents.
Not only was there an overwhelming odor of air fresheners, but a
can of Lysol, a can of Armor All, orange peels, and other air
fresheners.

There were two cell phones.

Again, none of those by

themselves would amount to any level of reasonable suspicion
because many people have an air freshener, for example.
but probably few, may have two cell phones.

Some,

But, based on

training and experience, the strong and overwhelming odor, caused
by at least 4 different odor-producing agents that were present,
could reasonably and objectively be seen as masking agents for
the odor of drugs.

That, to this court, is an objective set of

circumstances that justified the officer in asking questions,
that is, further detaining defendant.

Given those objective

indications of possible criminal activity often associated with
controlled substances, the officer could temporarily detain
defendant to quickly dispel or confirm those reasonable
suspicions based on those articulated factors.
8. The suspicion was not dispelled by the brief
conversation, so the officer took the most rational step of
asking for consent, to quickly dispel or confirm the suspicion.
When that consent was refused, the office took the next
reasonable step designed to quickly, at roadside with a mobile
vehicle, dispel or justify and confirm his suspicion.

That

consisted of having a drug detection dog go around the vehicle
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quickly.
9. That dog alerted on the vehicle and that gave the
officers probable cause to initiate the search of the vehicle and
further detain defendant. Of course once the 60 pounds of
marijuana was found, there was probable cause to arrest. Again,
the actual arrest is not challenged except the basic claim it was
the product of an unlawful detention.

If the temporary detention

was unlawful, there is certainly no attenuation and the arrest
would be unlawful.
10. In combination and totality, the "odor'' factors amounted
to reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant. She was not
free to leave but was seized temporarily but that temporary
detention was justified by the articulated reasonable suspicion
the officer had. Defendant was not detained beyond the traffic
stop prior to Jensen's learning all of the above information.
11. Again, there is no challenge to anything but the
legality of the detention. The court has found and concludes,
there was a detention but it was lawful.

The court DENIES the motion to suppress the results of the
search.

As noted in court, the matter is set for a status conference
June 2, 2008.

If the matter is to be set for trial at that time
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defendant is to be present.

If some further negotiations are to

be undertaken defendant need not be present until either those
negotiations are terminated and the matter is to be set for a
change of plea or a trial.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

DATED this

day of

, 2008.
<.<c , *'- va ' x "

BY THE COURT;

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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